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This paper empirically probes competition in the South African manufacturing sector using the latest published data on 
the industries of this sector released by the national statistical office. It is found that enterprise behaviour in this sector is 
governed by competition where the negativity between industry concentration and its linkages with output, employment, 
labour productivity, profit margins, rates of return, investment, and producer prices, has more to do with the limiting of 
rivalry between enterprises, as opposed to growing concentration promoting by itself poor economic performance. The 
findings are consistent with earlier investigations. From a managerial perspective, they suggest that while adaptive 
behaviour by enterprises through imitation or experimental actions is likely to lead to positive profitability, any resultant 
profit margins and rates of return are ultimately dependant on how successful or decisive enterprises are at innovating if 
they wish to grow their output, raise labour productivity, invest and employ more, as well as secure the demand-inducing 
prices commensurate with their innovative record. Thus the success of an enterprise rests on its ability to innovate.  
 
Introduction 
 
In 2012, Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) published the 
second edition of the Compendium of Industrial Statistics 
(CIS). The Compendium furnishes a large amount of data on 
the economic performance of the South African 
manufacturing sector, which makes it possible to examine 
competition in the industries making up the manufacturing 
sector. This is what the present study is about. By 
competition is meant rivalry among enterprises within and 
across industries to supply a product or to remove unwanted 
demand in a product (Stigler, 1957: 1-2). To recall, market 
and industry are terms synonymously identified and 
interchanged with each other, and the same convention will 
be followed here. Likewise the same will be done for the 
terms of firm and enterprise since they too are 
synonymously identified and interchanged with each other.  
 
Competition at the market or industry level is commonly 
articulated in terms of its industrial – sometimes called 
business – concentration. This captures to what extent the 
share of output, sales, assets or employment of an industry 
falls in the hands of few enterprises (Stigler, 1964: 18).  In 
this way, the level of concentration in an industry shows 
whether its market structure can be characterised by 
monopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic competition or perfect 
competition (Ertl & McCarrell, 2002: 9). Stigler (1964: 20) 
notes that by practical convention the dividing line between 
what is few and many enterprises in an industry is taken as 
four, such that an industry with up to four enterprises is 
considered to be composed of few enterprises and an 
industry with more than four enterprises is considered to be 
composed of many enterprises.   
 
To recall, by economic textbook convention, market 
structure denotes the competitive situation in which a firm 
operates. On this basis, Khemani and Shapiro (1993: 58-63) 
define monopoly as the situation with a single supplying 
enterprise in a market, oligopoly as the situation with a 
small number of supplying enterprises who are 
interdependent in their pricing and output decisions, 
monopolistic competition as the situation with a small 
number of supplying enterprises who are independent in 
their pricing and output decisions, and perfect competition 
as the situation with a large number of supplying enterprises 
who are disconnected from each other in their pricing and 
output decisions. Table 1 gives a summarised account of the 
market conditions characteristic of each of these market 
structures, shortened from a review by Andreosso and 
Jacobson (2005: 104-114).  
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Table 1: Market structures and their market conditions 
 
 Market Structure 
Perfect Competition Monopolistic competition Oligopoly Monopoly 
Concentration level 0% ≤ G < 50% 50% ≤ G < 90% 90% ≤ G ≤ 100% 
 
 
 
 
 
Market conditions 
faced by enterprises 
 
 
 
 
 
Free entry Free entry Entry is restricted Entry is restricted 
Complete product 
information 
Complete product 
information 
Incomplete product 
information 
Incomplete product 
information 
No private collusion No private collusion Private collusion is possible No private collusion 
Product variety is 
missing  
Product variety exists Product variety is possible Product variety is limited 
or missing   
Equal access to 
production technologies 
Equal access to production 
technologies 
Equal access to production 
technologies is possible 
Unequal access to 
production technologies 
Capital and labour are 
immediately mobile 
Capital and labour are 
immediately mobile 
Capital and labour are not 
immediately mobile 
Capital and labour are 
not immediately mobile 
No market power Market power is 
immediately contestable 
Immediate contestability of 
market power is possible 
Market power is not  
immediately contestable 
 
The industrial concentration levels of each structure reported 
in Table 1, which are based on the levels of the Gini 
concentration index (G), are those suggested by Reekie 
(1989: 48). On the one hand, a Gini concentration index 
with a value of zero implies no industrial concentration, 
which depicts the ideal market structure of perfect 
competition. On the other hand a Gini concentration index 
of one implies absolute concentration in the sense of a single 
firm occupying an industry, which depicts the market 
structure of monopoly. Being a grey area - in the sense of 
depicting perfect competition with product differentiation or 
variety - monopolistic competition shares the same level of 
concentration with perfect competition (Cabral, 2000: 92). 
This is because the longevity of this differentiation is 
limited.  
 
The crux of the content in Table 1 is that from the traditional 
economic standpoint, monopoly and competition are 
inversely related, provided barriers to entry are present and 
innovative activity is retarded. If the latter two exist, the 
higher an industry’s or market’s concentration level is, the 
closer to monopoly it moves, and resultantly the less 
competitive it becomes.   
 
Moreover, higher industry concentration levels are assumed 
to be encouraging of collusion among incumbent firms in 
the sense of making it easier for them to create a collective 
monopoly, which conversely reduces the degree of 
competition in an industry. In such a closed market 
environment, existing firms then become large and may 
abuse their market power as part of earning higher returns. 
To remind, market power is the ability of an enterprise to 
alter prices and competition itself (Lachmann, 1992: 29, 32). 
 
A comprehensive review by Fedderke and Simbanegavi 
(2008: 147-180) of concentration studies done on the South 
African manufacturing sector over the last quarter century, 
shows two prominent things. Firstly, the level of 
concentration is high and increasing across a wide range of 
industries making up this sector. Secondly, the resultantly  
high or increasing  concentration levels have been linked to 
persistently high or rising growth in producer prices and 
profit margins, in addition to lower or declining growth in: 
output, employment, labour productivity, investment (i.e. 
capital accumulation), and lastly industrial rates of return. 
Considering that the importance of studying industry 
concentration is at the heart of determining whether an 
industry or a sector of the economy is competitive, it 
appears appropriate to probe what the applicable case for the 
South African manufacturing sector is.  
 
To this end, the available data in the Compendium of 
Industrial Statistics will be used. Critical to this enquiry will 
be exploring how barriers to entry interact with innovative 
activity. As outlined by Khemani and Shapiro (1993: 13, 
49), (a) barriers to entry are obstacles induced by incumbent 
enterprises in their normal course of business, which prevent 
or deter the entry of new enterprises into an industry, and (b) 
innovative activity is the activity undertaken by an 
enterprise to move out of imitation and/or duplication.  
 
Barriers to entry and innovative activity  
 
There are three types of barriers to entry (West, 2007: 3-4), 
namely (a) absolute cost advantages, referring to the 
attainment of lower total costs of operation in relation to 
rivals; (b) economies of scale, referring to falling average 
costs of operation as output increases; and (c) product 
differentiation, referring to the absence of perfect product 
substitution between rivals.   
 
Martins and Price (2004: 6-8) have proposed two distinct 
general classifications for manufacturing industries 
according to barriers to entry. The first classification is 
based on a combination of absolute cost advantages and 
economies of scale. To this end, they identify these 
advantages from each industry’s set-up, i.e. sunk costs as 
belonging to the plants with economies of scale in the 
familiar sense that such plants have the lowest average cost 
of production.  
 
The second classification is based on product differentiation. 
Here, Martins and Price (2004: 6-8) identify if such 
differentiation exists in terms of relative R&D intensity as 
measured by each industry’s outlays of R&D spending to  
its gross output. Martins and Price (2004: 7) note that this 
latter classification is in effect also a classification of 
innovative activity since (a) such activity is a prerequisite 
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for product differentiation, and (b) R&D expenditure 
knowingly carries widespread technological spill-over 
effects. Table 2 gives a summary of the Martins-Price 
classifications after they are applied to all industries in the 
Compendium of Industrial Statistics.  
 
 
Table 2: Manufacturing industries classified by entry barriers and innovative activity 
 
 Innovative activity 
Low High 
Barriers to entry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low 
Fabricated metal products 
Food products 
Footwear 
Furniture and fixtures 
Leather and fur 
Non-metallic minerals 
Paper and paper products 
Plastics 
Printing and publishing 
Textiles 
Wearing apparel 
Wood products 
Non-electrical machinery 
SciTech equipment 
Recycling and refined assembly 
 
 
High 
Beverages 
Glass and glass products 
Iron and steel 
Non-ferrous metals 
Rubber products 
Tobacco 
Electrical machinery 
Industrial chemicals 
Petroleum and petrochemicals 
Raw chemicals 
Transport equipment 
 
 
West (2007: 1-4) and Fagerberg (2009: 20-21) have 
provided simple but effective explanations as to why 
barriers to entry and innovative activity serve as pre-
determinants for the inverse relationship between monopoly 
and competition. As West (2007: 1, 4) points out, before an 
enterprise can compete in an industry, it has to be able to 
enter it. As such, entry barriers can retard, diminish, or 
entirely prevent the industry’s usual mechanism for 
checking market power, which is the attraction and arrival 
of new enterprises. On the other hand as Fagerberg (2009: 
20-21) highlights, in true Schumpeterian style, the arrival of 
the new enterprise or the creation of entry barriers by the 
incumbent enterprise, is completely dependent on their 
innovative activities to succeed with introducing: a new 
product, a new technology or method of production, a new 
source of supply in the form of a new input to production or 
the opening up of a new market, and lastly a new type of 
organization that compliments the implementation of either 
of these introductions. Resultantly different configurations 
between barriers to entry and innovative activity produce 
different market environments with understandably different 
concentration levels. To see this, Table 3 presents these 
environments after merging Table 1 with Table 2.  
 
 
Table 3: Entry barriers and innovative activity by industry structure and concentration 
 
 Innovative activity 
Low High 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barriers 
to entry 
Low 
Perfect competition 
 
OR 
 
Oligopoly 
 
(0% ≤ G < 90%) 
Monopolistic competition 
 
OR 
 
Oligopoly 
 
(0% ≤ G < 90%) 
High 
Oligopoly 
 
OR 
 
Monopoly 
 
(50% ≤ G ≤ 100%) 
Oligopoly 
 
OR 
 
Monopoly 
 
(50% ≤ G ≤ 100%) 
 
One of the realizations to be gained from Table 3 is that 
unlike perfect competition and monopolistic competition, 
the market structures of oligopoly and monopoly are 
transient. They can occur either when barriers to entry are 
high and innovative activity is low, or alternatively when 
both of these are high. Examples of the former include 
parastatal-run industries where the licensed incumbent is the 
sole provider of a singular product relatively unchallenged 
by the need to innovate. Examples of the latter include 
closely contested industries where incoming or existing 
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incumbents maintain or gain competitive position according 
to the innovations they bring to market. Which structure is 
applicable is dependent on the facts of each case under 
consideration.  
 
On its own, oligopoly also arises when barriers to entry and 
innovative activity are low, as well as when this activity is 
high. The first of these oligopoly cases – also called 
Bertrand’s paradox – is known to prevail with as few as two 
enterprises. This occurs when the industry in which they 
operate is unattractive to potential entrants because of the 
absence of entry barriers (Tirole, 1998: 210-211). The 
absence of these barriers is the very reason why the two-
firm (i.e. duopoly) arrangement is capable of yielding a 
perfectly competitive market. The second oligopoly case 
occurs if innovative activity in the form of product 
differentiation is easy to imitate or duplicate soon after 
introduction.  
 
The other realization offered by Table 3 is that it gives 
context to understanding the findings of high concentration 
levels in the South African manufacturing sector referred to 
earlier on.  Such a picture points to the presence of an 
oligopolistic structure within and across industries that is 
defined by high barriers to entry and low innovative activity. 
It is in such a situation that the attraction or arrival of new 
competitors is held back, at the same time as is the lessening 
of the drive for innovative activity among incumbent 
enterprises, since the impetus for entry which would check 
the incumbent’s market power is restrained. By implication, 
only when the manufacturing sector and its industries are 
affected in this way should the found negative consequences 
from high concentration be expected. But sticking to such 
explanation gives a monotonous picture of competition in 
the South African manufacturing sector, because it does not 
admit of the likely existence of the other possibilities 
sketched out in Table 2.  
 
For instance superior ability in lowering production costs or 
in improving products, be it the consequence of scale 
economies or absolute cost advantages, may well shift 
profits and sales from the unsuccessful to the successful and 
efficient firms (Reekie, 1991: 32). Thus high or rising 
concentration levels can be attributed to reasons totally 
disconnected from contrived scarcity or even unchecked 
market power. Such situations will move the manufacturing 
sector toward an oligopolistic or monopolising market 
structure that is characterised by high entry barriers in 
response to high innovative activity. New entrants or 
existing rivals within and across industries will emulate or 
improve upon the activities of the successful enterprises 
until the gains from doing so no longer exist. Then, shifts 
will take place to any of the other possible market 
environments, i.e. configurations.  
 
To be clear, the gains are specific to the enterprises, which 
perform well in terms of productive efficiency, as being 
reflected in their absolute cost advantages and/or economies 
of scale, as well as in the innovations they bring in the form 
of the product differentiation they create. Other firms in the 
same industry will not share in these gains unless they are 
generated from the same sources. By analogy the same will 
hold across all industries. Thus, if firms increase in size they 
may be able to benefit from economies of scale, which is a 
cost advantage due to size. In this way when the firm 
becomes large it will have a lower cost per unit of output 
than a smaller firm, which should transmit into lower 
product prices. Such a beneficial outcome is likely to occur 
in industries characterised by high fixed costs and a greater 
scope of specialization in innovation.  
 
By contrast, if the source of the gains is not to compete on 
productive efficiency or innovation – as will occur under 
enterprise arrangements in favour of collective monopoly or 
collusion – then the “competitive” impact on the likes of 
industry concentration, output, employment, labour 
productivity, profit margins, rates of return, investment, and 
producer prices will become uniform as the firms within any 
industry strive to collude. In such a situation, the impact on 
the market environment will be identical to that of high 
entry barriers and low innovative activity. This is because 
this is the market environment that collective monopoly 
creates. Kornai (1980: 152, 155) explains how. If such 
monopoly is created it allows its participating enterprises to 
fix a price for the product they make. This also enables them 
to increase product prices out of turn, without the corrective 
power of competition since only they can benefit from the 
price fixture. In this way the life of the participating 
enterprises and the life of the people working for them 
become more secure, since fear of any vital danger is 
removed. This in itself also induces an easy-going, 
minimalistic attitude to productivity. If the survival of each 
participating enterprise is automatically guaranteed, the 
personal responsibility of its employees is obscured, such 
that the incentives for productive efficiency and innovation 
become retarded or stunted. The enterprise becomes aware 
that neither its survival, nor even its growth, depends strictly 
on profitability. By extension, in implementing its 
investment decisions, the enterprise can go beyond the 
financial resources available currently or in the near future, 
without too much risk, as the loss will sooner or later be 
passed in the form of higher prices. On the one hand this 
will then lead to thoughtless investment decisions, and on 
the other hand to wasteful implementation, which again will 
harm efficiency. Hence, should incumbent or incoming 
enterprises aim to maintain or improve competitive position 
by forming collective monopolies as the means to 
“compete”, the observance of an anti-competitive outcome 
within and across industries will be a matter of fact.   
 
To test whether the above is the “competing” approach by 
enterprises in South Africa’s manufacturing industries, the 
next section presents empirical findings from the available 
data in the Compendium of Industrial Statistics. That section 
also sheds light on the possible sources shaping competition 
in these industries. In respect of the empirical enquiry, the 
computed indicators are derived from the published 
Compendium data, which has annual coverage from 2003 
through to 2010. The choice of computational techniques is 
predicated on the recommendation by Everitt and Dunn 
(1982: 45) to choose the simplest from those that are 
S.Afr.J.Bus.Manage.2015,46(3) 25 
 
 
applicable to one’s data, as this will ease the difficult task of 
interpreting the final results. 
 
With this in mind, the computations are done along the 
following lines:   
 
(a) Each industry’s concentration level over the 
aforementioned time period is obtained as its geometric 
mean in order to capture the overall progression of 
these levels by minimising the influence of their 
outlying observations.  Thereafter the concentration 
level of each market environment is obtained as the 
arithmetic average of these means.  
(b) Output growth for each industry is firstly obtained as 
the compound annual growth rate from the indexed 
series of its value added in real terms. Afterwards these 
compound annual growth rates are arithmetically 
averaged to get the output growth of each market 
environment.  
(c) The same averaging procedure for output growth is 
applied to obtain the series of: growth in investment, 
which stems from the compound annual growth rates of 
the indexed series of gross capital stock in real terms; 
growth in labour productivity, which stems from the 
compound annual growth rates of the labour 
productivity index; growth in employment, which stems 
from the compound annual growth rates of the indexed 
series of the number of employed; and lastly the growth 
in producer prices, which stems from the compound 
annual growth rates of the series for the Fisher price 
index.  
(d) To recall, an industry’s profit margin is estimated as the 
ratio of its gross operating profit – being the difference 
between its value added and labour remuneration – to 
its gross output, while an industry’s rate of return is 
estimated as the ratio of its gross operating profit to its 
gross capital stock. These formulations are applied to 
the compound annual growth rates of the indexed real-
denominated series of gross operating profit, labour 
remuneration, gross output, and gross capital stock, to 
obtain the growth series of each industry’s profit margin 
and that of its rate of return. Then, these latter two 
series are averaged, to get the overall growth in profit 
margin and that of the rate of return for each market 
environment. 
(e) Lastly, the yearly values for each indicator are obtained 
as the most probable maximum value the indicator is 
likely to assume. This is done by deriving the upper 
limits of their Chebyshev confidence intervals as 
applied on their averaged series. Chebyshev intervals 
are computed because in each case we are dealing with 
small sample sizes of fewer than thirty observations, in 
addition to not knowing in any case the applicable 
distribution of an indicator or for that matter its 
population’s standard deviation or mean. The benefits 
from working with the yearly confidence interval 
estimates are twofold. Firstly, they give each indicator’s 
most likely estimate that is attainable in the time period 
considered, thereby focusing attention on its most 
feasible value. Secondly, in one number, they 
incorporate the variability of the indicators’ series by 
accounting for all their fluctuations over time, thus 
sharpening the focus of inspection to a single rather 
than several numbers. Using the standard convention 
for lack of precision at 5%, the 95% one-sided 
Chebyshev confidence interval is calculated for all 
indicators, which depicts the most probable maximum 
value the indicators are likely to assume, on the 
average, in 95% of the time. To this end, the intervals 
are computed according to the procedure described in 
Salvatore (1982: 78). This involves adding to each 
indicator’s averaged value its margin of error. The latter 
is obtained as the product between the constant of the 
coverage probability that will yield the one-sided 95% 
confidence level, which is 3.16 in the present instance, 
and the ratio of each indicator’s standard deviation to 
the square root of the number of its participating 
observations.    
 
Empirical findings  
 
Table 4 presents the results of the numerical analysis with 
reference to the indicators’ yearly values computed 
according to the outlined steps. It is clearly visible that if 
collective monopoly or collusion was indeed the dominant 
means by which enterprises seek to build their 
“competitive” positions, then the numerical picture in all 
market environments should be the same as that for high-
barriers to entry and low innovative activity. But as the 
numbers are different, this is clearly not the case. By 
implication then, the source of enterprises creating 
competitive advantage between and within industries 
appears to be competition itself. It is precisely because of 
competition that the numerical outcomes of different market 
environments are not uniform.  
 
The rivalry among enterprises between and within industries 
to supply a product or to remove unwanted demand in a 
product creates a commercial drive for allocative efficiency. 
As noted by Lachmann (1992: 25), and subsequently by 
Cabral (2000: 26-27, 159), such drive prompts enterprises to 
innovate and to create productive efficiency.  The starting 
point is that some evidence in some industries shows the 
prospects for higher rates of return as opposed to this 
reachable in other industries, or indeed the industry in which 
the enterprise already operates in. This prompts a shift in 
investments away from those industries with lower rates of 
return to those with higher rates of return. This does not 
mean that the market environment with the better returns 
should be adopted at the expense of completely moving out 
of the market environment with less attractive returns. 
Instead both market environments can be operated in, if 
ways are found to minimize the relative differences in their 
rates of return. This is handled by not over-investing in the 
less rewarding market environment, and by not under-
investing in the more rewarding market environment. If 
however such discrepancy in investment does occur, then 
the response of enterprises is to shift resources out of the 
over-invested environment into the under-invested 
environment until in each case productive efficiency and 
innovation are allocated with minimal relative imbalance, 
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i.e. without allocative inefficiency.  Because such 
commercial acts are pursued by most if not all enterprises 
between and within industries, the ensuing competitive 
activity leads to different outcomes in different market 
environments, as evidenced by the figures in Table 4.   
 
Table 4: Effects of competition in industries with different market environments (Yearly values, 2003-2010)  
 
 Innovative activity 
Low High 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barriers 
to entry 
Low 
Concentration level 
77% 
Concentration level 
79% 
Output growth 
2.5% 
Output growth 
7.4% 
Employment growth 
1.8% 
Employment growth 
3.9% 
Labour productivity growth 
5.7% 
Labour productivity growth 
8.9% 
Growth in profit margins 
4.5% 
Growth in profit margins 
4.0% 
Rate of return growth 
5.8% 
Rate of return growth 
47.7% 
Investment growth 
0.2% 
Investment growth 
2.3% 
Producer prices growth 
6.0% 
Producer prices growth 
7.2% 
High 
Concentration level 
86% 
Concentration level 
88% 
Output growth 
2.3% 
Output growth 
2.6% 
Employment growth 
-1.2% 
Employment growth 
2.9% 
Labour productivity growth 
4.8% 
Labour productivity growth 
9.2% 
Growth in profit margins 
11.9% 
Growth in profit margins 
13.9% 
Rate of return growth 
3.9% 
Rate of return growth 
23.9% 
Investment growth 
0.6% 
Investment growth 
2.8% 
Producer prices growth 
9.3% 
Producer prices growth 
6.3% 
 
The sign illuminating the presence of allocative efficiency 
begins with the concentration levels of the different market 
environments. All concentration levels are in the 
oligopolistic range of between 77% and 88% of the Gini 
index, indicating that overall the manufacturing sector is 
characterised by an oligopolistic market structure 
irrespective of its market environment. This is seemingly 
innate since the next production process bringing best 
economies of scale will ultimately arise from enterprises 
competing to innovate in (a) product development, whether 
for inputs to production or final consumer products, (b) the 
opening up of previously inexistent markets, or (c) 
organizational function and form like the undertaking of 
unique mergers and acquisitions aimed at defining and 
redefining the nature and scope of their operations. The 
enterprise that discovers or adopts anyone or all of these 
innovations will gain absolute cost advantages relative to its 
rivals. As a consequence, a market environment with high 
barriers to entry and high innovative activity will walk hand-
in-hand with higher concentration then if either barriers to 
entry or innovative activity were lower. The present 
concentration numbers bear this out.  
Those industries with high innovative activity, which 
incidentally also promotes high barriers to entry, are able to 
support such activity subject to greater labour productivity. 
This is because more innovation demands more of skilled 
labour. Provided the uptake of this type of labour is without 
diminishing returns, increases in skilled labour will deliver 
closely similar increases in production. Thus the growths of 
output and employment in the market environment of both 
high barriers to entry and innovative activity will tend to 
follow each other closely. This is corroborated by their 
respective numbers of 2.6% and 2.9% per annum. More 
importantly, the higher absorption of skilled labour also 
explains why the same market environment experiences the 
highest growth in labour productivity of 9.2% per annum 
relative to the lesser innovative markets, where this 
productivity growth drops to between 4.8% and 5.7% per 
annum.  
 
But innovation is a double-edged sword. While it confers 
gains in labour productivity, minor innovations – also 
known as imitations and duplications – from competing 
enterprises, will cut through profit margins and rates of 
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return for everyone in the industry they are introduced in. 
Resultantly, for industries with highly innovative activity 
and high barriers to entry, growths in profit margin and rates 
of return drop respectively from 13.9% to 4.5% and from 
23.9% to 5.8% per annum, to mirror the shift to a lessened 
innovative activity and lower barriers to entry, as more 
imitations and/or duplications arise. To get out of such a 
situation, enterprises have to make investments into new 
innovative activities to give them the next high barrier to 
entry, as well as to make it possible for them to extract the 
premium from such a move, which is embodied by an 
accelerated growth of producer prices. For the market 
environment with high entry barriers and high innovative 
activity this is corroborated by its higher positive growths of 
investment and producer prices, which at 2.8% and 6.3% per 
annum are correspondingly higher to the 0.2% and 6.0% per 
annum for the market environment with low innovative 
activity and low barriers to entry.  
 
At 6.0% per annum, the extent of price increases in 
industries with low barriers to entry and low innovative 
activity is somewhat lower to the 6.3% per annum for the 
industries sharing high innovative activity and high barriers 
to entry. The reason for this lower growth in prices is 
attributable either to the slowdown or lack of innovative 
activity because it forces enterprises to make supplies of 
essentially the same or similar products thereby limiting the 
scope for price increases. Under such a situation, the annual 
growth of labour productivity of 5.7% per annum that is 
experienced by industries with low barriers to entry and low 
innovative activity does not come from higher growth in 
employment given that less of skilled labour will be needed, 
but more from the higher growth in the output of the same 
or similar products being produced. The discrepancy 
between employment and output growth for these industries, 
at 1.8% and 2.5% per annum respectively, confirms this.  
 
On the other hand the rise in producer prices in industries 
with both high innovative activity and barriers to entry is 
delimited by any ensuing innovative activity. It is precisely 
because of such activity that highly innovative industries 
with higher barriers to entry have a relatively lower increase 
in producer prices, which also extends to those industries 
typified by lower innovation and higher barriers to entry. 
For the latter industries, the corresponding figure in the 
growth of producer prices is 9.3% per annum.  
 
As to be anticipated, the market environment defined by 
high barriers to entry and low innovative activity produces 
the highest increases in producer prices, essentially due to 
its high barriers to entry. These barriers have the effect of 
delaying entry, and by so doing delaying competition from 
bringing price increases down.   Because the persistence of 
these price increases is not due to innovative activity given 
that this activity is low or subdued, enterprises loose the 
incentive to outperform the output that enterprises in other 
industries churn out. This is reflected in the comparatively 
lower increases of output growth at 2.3% per annum relative 
to the other market environments where this growth is 
between 2.5% and 2.6% per annum, depending on whether 
the corresponding comparison is with respect to the market 
environment of low innovative activity and low barriers to 
entry or that of high barriers to entry and high innovative 
activity. This lack of incentive to perform better in 
production, especially in terms of innovative output, slows 
down the demand for skilled labour. This explains why the 
market environment of high barriers to entry and low 
innovative activity experiences a contraction in employment 
of 1.2% per annum.   
 
This contraction in the uptake of employment coupled with 
the comparatively lower growth in output, leads to the 
slowest acceleration of labour productivity in the industries 
with low innovative activity and high barriers to entry 
compared to the other market environments. The findings 
also show a similar case for the market environment with 
jointly low innovative activity and barriers to entry because 
here enterprises will get to keep their presence only if their 
existing labour force can produce more of the same product.  
 
A market environment with higher barriers to entry and 
lower innovative activity de facto resembles a closed 
market, in which as known incumbent enterprises have 
seemingly guaranteed yields because the threat of entry is 
weakened. Because of the relative market foreclosure, the 
motivation to innovate, which comes with entry, dissipates. 
Consequentially this leads to inefficient production with 
dated or outdated methods and processes. By chain reaction, 
the growth of investment also holds back. As explained 
earlier on, this is because in a closed or relatively closed 
market, enterprises have no incentive to compete for the 
benefit of improving supply. By contrast, as the present 
numbers show, in a relatively open market, i.e. this with 
lower barriers to entry and higher innovative activity, the 
unfolding situation is diametrically opposing. Growth of 
investment in the relatively closed market is 0.6% per 
annum but 2.3% per annum in the relatively open market. 
This conforms to expectations, as after all, industries closed 
from competition are shielded from entry, which does not 
compel them to innovate or to be productively efficient. By 
contrast such pressure cannot be avoided in the more open 
market environment. By corollary, low growth in investment 
essentially means that present as well as future market 
opportunities that could be efficiently or effectively 
exploited are foregone. Such dual loss from present and 
future opportunities hits the rate of return harder than the 
profit margin as the former is more intimately connected to 
the opportunity costs of an enterprise than the latter. By 
extension this would translate into a larger prospective 
decline in the growth of the rate of return to that of the profit 
margin. This conclusion is supported by the present results. 
For instance, at 3.9% per annum, the growth in the rate of 
return for the relatively closed market environment is 
noticeably smaller to the 47.7% per annum for the relatively 
open market environment, whereas the parallel difference 
from 11.9% to 4.0% per annum in the growth of their profit 
margins is substantially smaller.  
 
There is more. The results suggest that the existence of 
market environments characterised by both low innovative 
activity and barriers to entry, or by low innovative activity 
and high barriers to entry, is a necessary condition firstly for 
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activating allocative efficiency, and secondly for cultivating 
the search for productive efficiency. The industries of these 
market environments have the lowest growing rates of 
return. This will prompt the affected enterprises to look to 
other markets where this can redressed. The market with 
low barriers to entry and high innovative activity is an 
obvious choice because (a) access is open, meaning that 
entry is practically unrestricted, even if the price for entry is 
innovation, (b) its rates of return, as confirmed by their 
numbers in Table 4, are better given their endurance under 
intense rivalry, and (c) at least from the view of enterprises 
already coming from an environment of low barriers to 
entry, there is the prospect of higher producer prices for any 
output produced, as  confirmed by the growth of producer 
prices, at 7.2% per annum, which is the highest outside that 
of the relatively closed market environment.   
 
Motivated by the above, those enterprises wanting redress 
from the relatively more closed markets will enter the 
relatively more open markets. These entries will bring 
growth in investment, in addition to that already made by 
any incumbent enterprises, which will altogether push 
investment growth even higher. As the investments are in 
support of increased innovation, the copying of which by 
imitation or duplication is very probable due to low barriers 
to entry, the growth in investment will fall slightly short of 
what it could be were imitation and duplication more 
restricted as in the case of higher barriers to entry. This is 
why the market with high innovative activity and low 
barriers to entry experiences growth in investment at 2.3% 
per annum that is second only to the market with similarly 
high innovative activity but higher barriers to entry at 2.8% 
per annum.  
 
Such investments in support of more innovation will give 
the enterprises that succeed in putting the resultant 
innovations to market, a position of relative monopoly.  This 
accounts for why a relatively high concentration level of 
79% is observed for the relatively open market.  But to 
remind, this monopoly is relative, because other attempts at 
innovation motivated by this environment’s promising rates 
of return, will have as their goal the introduction of 
imitations or duplications to the original product. This will 
weaken the initial monopolist’s position. And if rivals 
pursue the marketing of these imitations or duplications 
vigorously, over-trading sets in, resulting in excessive 
production. In the present case, this is witnessed by the 
industries in the relatively open market environment having 
the highest growth in output, which at 7.4% per annum 
exceeds that of any other market environment. As the 
introduction of another innovative product, or indeed its 
imitation or duplication, is always possible, competition to 
meet demand for the same or similar products will spread. 
Vying for market position by means of bringing major or 
minor innovations to market, will demand that enterprises 
recruit skilled labour, albeit to different degrees. As part and 
parcel of this, together with an increased growth in 
production, employment growth in the relatively open 
market environment will also increase. The results show that 
this increase comes to 3.9% per annum. However because of 
excessive production in this environment, its employment 
growth will be comparatively lower, as happens to be the 
case. Consequentially a strong growth of labour productivity 
will occur in this environment. This growth will be 
reflective of the rivalry between enterprises to be in a 
continuous race to innovate. As the relatively easier copying 
of products will make the gains from innovation shorter in 
duration, the experienced growth in labour productivity will 
be slightly lower to that of the market with equally high 
innovative activity but higher barriers to entry. This is 
supported by the small difference in the growths of labour 
productivity between the two market environments, being 
8.9% and 9.2% per annum respectively.  
 
The foregoing concludes the empirical probe.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The present study examined competition in the South 
African manufacturing sector from the latest published 
statistics in the Stats SA Compendium of Industrial 
Statistics. It is found that there is limited evidence to support 
the existence of domineering market power between and 
within industries. Instead the picture that emerges is one of 
market power being curtailed by competition in which 
enterprises engage in rivalry for market supply. They appear 
to do so by means of:  
 
(a) Allocative efficiency to find the markets where they 
should operate if rates of return from existing 
operations are unpromising;  
(b) Productive efficiency reflected in economies of scale 
and absolute cost advantages to secure not only cost 
effective ways to production but also to ensure that 
such production is not easily replicated by rivals; and  
(c) Innovating through the introduction of products, 
production processes, and operational structures that 
seek to make both aforementioned types of efficiencies 
possible.  
 
The empirical results of the study show that competition 
impacts different market environments differently. Where 
the market environment makes it less likely for allocative 
efficiency, productive efficiency, and innovation to emerge, 
rivalry becomes less likely and vice versa. Consequentially 
any negativity from industry or market concentration to its 
linkages with output, employment, labour productivity, 
profit margins, rates of return, investment, and producer 
prices, has more to do with the limiting of rivalry between 
enterprises, as opposed to high industrial concentration by 
itself promoting poor economic performance. This is the 
central message of the current empirical probe.  
 
It should be kept in mind that the findings are not in 
isolation. For instance, using Stats SA data on the South 
African manufacturing sector, Leach (1992: 151-152; 1997: 
18-22) twice found the prevalence of the same competitive 
picture in this sector.  Thus the contribution of the present 
study, as well as these past studies, is to contextually the 
understanding of industrial concentration in the South 
African manufacturing sector. The studies are consistent in 
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showing that according to official statistics the high level of 
concentration in this sector is not linked to firm conduct that 
is absent of competition. Instead they fit closely with 
Alchian’s (1950: 218) seminal description of market rivalry 
where:  
 
“The pursuit of profits … is the relevant objective whose 
fulfilment is rewarded with survival. Unfortunately, even 
this proximate objective is too high. Neither perfect 
knowledge of the past nor complete awareness of the 
current state … gives sufficient foresight to indicate 
profitable action. …The pervasive effects of uncertainty 
prevent … actions which are supposed to be optimal in 
achieving profits.”    
 
As a result, adaptive behaviour by enterprises through 
imitation or experimental (i.e. trial-and-error) actions while 
being very likely to lead to positive profitability is poised to 
bring a market environment where profit margins and rates 
of return are determined by how successful or decisive they 
are at innovating if they wish to grow their output, raise 
labour productivity, invest and employ more, and also 
secure the demand-inducing prices commensurate with their 
innovative record.  
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